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Corporate Positions and Punishment for Corporate 
Accounting Fraud 
By Stephanie Curtis 
The accounting industry has changed in many ways during the 
last few years. These changes have come at many different levels and 
have had different effects on those in the accounting industry and those 
without. The biggest change has been the litigation and government 
involvement in the industry. Changes have been made because of the 
fraud committed by those in the accounting industry. This has led to 
the government making laws to restrict those in the industry, making 
fraud harder to commit. The laws that the government has made have 
made it very expensive and hard for those in the industry to comply. 
Many companies have needed to hire more accountants. This leads to 
an increased need for accountants and could lead to a shortage in 
qualified accountants. This then would lead to those not qualified in 
accounting doing accounting work. This would also lead to more 
litigation and court filings and more laws that limit companies on their 
ability to complete the required work. It thus becomes a vicious cycle. 
There are many factors that have influenced changes in the 
accounting industry. The biggest changes have come because of the 
loss of faith from the community in general, concerning the reliability of 
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accounting practices given. The reason that the loss of faith has come 
is because of fraud within the industry. One reason fraud is committed 
is to present a rosy picture to the public of a company so that stock will 
sell. But when someone in the company commits fraud, and it is 
exposed, it does the opposite. 
"A varnished corporate governance model does not actually 
reflect its business competitiveness, nor can a brilliant financial 
statement predict the corporate prospects. When decision-makers are 
confronted with a speculative or risky investment environment, 
business operators may adopt risk-aversion strategies by policy analysis 
tools. In recent years, there have been many financial distresses taking 
place in listed companies. Apart from corporate governance failures, 
many corporate owners are suspected of embezzling from the corporate 
assets by 'creative accounting' practices (Schilit, 2001), which not only 
leads to corporate financial distress but also acutely fluctuates the 
securities market and affects investors' equities. ,,j 
Fraud may take place by several different methods. It may also 
come from many different sources. To help combat the problem of 
accounting fraud, there have been many different steps taken. The first 
step has been that the government has imposed conditions and rules on 
the accounting industry. The second step is that they have changed the 
2 
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consequences for those who have violated these rules. The first step 
includes the set up of the Sarbanes-Oxley act. Before this act became 
law, the government did not have much control over the accounting 
industry. They began to exert more control by setting up the SEC that 
has the ability to decide the rules about which accounting methods are 
acceptable and the punishments involved for breaking the rules. The 
industry previously had a group that would take care of this 
themselves. 
The second step to combat accounting fraud is the punishment 
and enforcement of the laws regarding accounting . They are meant to 
discourage people from completing the fraud . The risks would be 
greater than the gain. The problem with this idea working is that the 
gain can be so big in accounting fraud that it is hard to find a 
punishment that would counter that. Another difficulty with 
enforcement of the laws is that there are so many different types of 
fraud that could be committed , it is difficult for investigators to be able 
to find the fraud committed. 
There are correlations between the type of fraud committed 
and the position that the person holds in the company. There is also a 
correlation between the position of the person committing the fraud and 
what the punishment is. The reason that this correlation exists is that 
3 
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the position a person holds in the company makes a difference in the 
activities that a person is involved in . The activities enable a person to 
create various types of fraud. The type of fraud committed has a direct 
affect on the type of punishment that a person receives. 
The information that is being considered is the litigation 
releases from the SEC. The type of fraud has been categorized into 
sections of financial statement fraud, forgery, false advertising, 
employee theft, financial disclosure violation, reckless conduct, 
improper conduct, money laundering, racketeering, compliance, 
securities fraud, falsifying records, disclosure, insider trading, 
accounting fraud, misrepresentation, illicit payments, and wire fraud. 
The cases are taken from the SEC website and include AAER release 
number 719 to 2288. These cases have been classified into sections by 
the type of fraud committed, the people that were involved in the 
committing the fraud and the punishment that they are subjected to. 
These cases are found with other information of the release date , the 
number assigned, the company, ticker symbol, exchange, and a 
description of the type of fraud. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had a large effect on the 
accounting field and the changes that have been made to its regulation. 
This act was put into place in March of 2003. It has made some major 
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changes in accounting. The first change is that the government now 
has authority over the restrictions and regulations for the industry. The 
way this is possible is that the Act set up the SEC, which has the 
authority to regulate the type of information that is required of 
companies. The SEC also has the authority to punish those that do not 
abide by the laws. This paper uses the resolutions and pronouncements 
that the SEC made against various individuals. 
The next change that occurred with the SEC is that the 
restrictions are more stringent on what specifically has to happen when 
certain acts of fraud are committed. Before this law took effect, people 
that committed fraud were not restricted from continuing their practice 
of accounting in a different company. Some say that these rules are 
too strong and are hard to follow . "Finkenbrink, 44, said he has heard 
of several financial executives who have resigned in the wake of 
Sarbanes-Oxley. Most well-known locally is Bob Merritt, who resigned 
as CFO of Outback Steakhouse Inc . a year ago largely because of 
discontent over the new regulations. ,,jj 
The type of fraud committed can be so varied that it is difficult 
to be able to classify the information into groups. Within each of the 
classifications that are being used there are many different sub-
classifications. For instance, within the section of financial statement 
5 
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fraud, there can be over or under statement of assets or liabilities or 
improper classification on the statement of information. But in this 
paper, the differences and variability in accounting fraud classifications 
will not be a problem because there are also many similarities. 
The information includes the name of the position of the people 
that participated in committing the fraud. There are some positions 
that are common and can be compared in a similar manner such as the 
president of the company, the CEO, the CFO, the accountant, and the 
internal and external auditors. There are many other positions that are 
listed in the worksheet but they are not used for this research, as they 
cannot be compared from company to company. An example is the 
brother-in-law of the CEO. Within the worksheet there is only one 
person with this position and it makes a comparison difficult. 
The SEC has not completed all of the pronouncements on who is 
guilty for the fraud and what the punishment should be. This makes 
our information incomplete by the fact that some of the spaces are left 
blank without any type of judgment on the subject. The number of 
pronouncements that have been made can help us make comparisons 
and create theories about future pronouncements. But the clarification 
should be made that the information could change and therefore change 
the theory. The SEC could also have different members in the future 
6 
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that will make different judgments on punishments. The government 
may change the rules in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to change what is 
required of the SEC and what they demand of the people that have 
committed the crime. 
Within the information that we are looking at, there are 1137 
records. The records do not exclusively have one type of fraud and one 
position. Of those records, 69 % of those records contain financial 
statement fraud, 17 .5% are accounting fraud, 11 % are disclosure 
problems, 5% are financial disclosure violation, 11 % are falsifying 
records, 12% of the records are improper conduct, 15% of the records 
are for misrepresentation, and the rest are under 5%. When describing 
the positions of the people involved in the fraud, 30% are CEOs, 35% 
are CFO, 18% are controllers 8% are COOs, 8% are EVPs, 24% are 
presidents, 29% are VPs, and the rest of the positions are under 5%. 
Within these numbers the greatest types of fraud committed is 
financial statement fraud and accounting fraud. Those are the two 
sections that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act influenced the most. The Act 
makes the leaders of the company sign off on the financial statements 
saying that they know what is stated in the financial statements and 
that the statements are true. This has made it possible for the 
government and the SEC to be able to hold the leaders of the company 
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responsible for mistakes in the statements. Seventy-nine percent of 
the accountants that have committed fraud have made financial 
statement fraud. Ninety-two percent of the CEOs involved participated 
in financial statement fraud. This is because the CEOs now are involved 
with the financial statements and cannot say that they were not 
involved. Looking from the other way, 28% of th3e people that 
participated in financial statement fraud were CEOs. Thirty- four 
percent of the financial statement fraud was from the position of 
president. When looking at this information, it can be assumed that the 
reason that these individuals are involved in the fraud of financial 
statements is because they now have to be responsible for the 
statements. If anyone was trying to commit that type of fraud they 
now would need the leaders, such as the president and CEO, to be 
involved so that the president or CEO would not expose the fraud 
before the financial statements were published. 
A different side of accounting fraud is committed by those that 
are suppose to validate the information that companies are putting forth 
in their statements and on their books. This is the job of the auditors. 
When looking at the fraud committed by auditors, 49.5% of it is 
improper conduct. When looking at improper conduct, auditors 
committed 40%. This relationship exists because improper conduct is 
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what auditors can do wrong. Auditors do not create financial 
statements and so they do not have as much opportunity to create that 
statement fraud. They do not create books and therefore do not 
commit accounting fraud as much. Improper and reckless conduct 
make up most of what they can do wrong because of the fact that they 
did not look at information or the financial statements and not see a 
problem or that a fraud had been committed. 
There is a correlation between the major types of fraud 
researched and the reasons for the types of fraud committed. The 
reason why the presidents, CEOs, and CFOs usually commit financial 
statement fraud is because that is the section of the business that they 
deal with the most and they are required to sign off on these 
documents . Auditors usually have improper or reckless conduct 
because their job is to search out the information given to them and 
validate it to make sure the information is correct. The type of 
punishment related to the position a person has in the company and 
what type of fraud they committed has the same type of correlation. 
When a person has committed a certain crime they get the same 
punishment as others that committed the same crime . 
9 
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When a person commits corporate accounting fraud the 
seriousness or size of the fraud is related to the position in the 
company. 
Thirty-nine percent of the cases with financial statement fraud have 
received a verdict. Fifty-eight percent of those with a verdict have a 
decision of the commission to make them cease what they were doing. 
Thirty-eight percent of those with a verdict received a punishment for 
their deeds. This means that 84% of those that have been caught 
committing financial statement fraud have not had a verdict on their 
case or received a verdict to stop what they had been doing in the past. 
Only 19% of the cases where financial statement fraud has 
been committed and the president is involved had any decision at all. 
With in that 19%, only 3 cases had any type of punishment . Of the 
19%, 64% were orders to cease the illegal activities. This is not much 
of a judgment because they should have ceased doing illegal act ions 
before they were caught. This indicates that presidents of companies 
that commit financial statement fraud have a very small chance of 
receiving punishment if they are caught. 
One of the difficulties with punishing presidents of companies is 
that the SEC does not have the authority to put them in jail. Another 
difficulty is that a person does not need a certain certificate or degree 
10 
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to be a president and therefore the Council cannot take away the 
misbehaving person's license, as they can with accountants and 
attorneys. This means that for a president to be punished they must be 
brought before the law. This is the only way to punish presidents and it 
is very costly for everyone, including the government. One reason that 
financial statement fraud is punished less than other types of fraud is 
because there are so many cases and so many things that people can 
do to commit fraud, that all examples can't be punished. An example is 
a small misstatement of the value of an old piece of equipment. 
However, this type of fraud should be punished to show that financial 
statement fraud is not acceptable. The problem with trying to punish 
those individuals involved is that there is no small punishment they 
could be given to keep them in line and not have a lawsuit. People 
involved such as those that sign off on the financial statements such as 
the president, CEO, and CFO; may not understand the statements very 
well, and some people are reluctant to prosecute them for questionable 
motives. 
Twelve percent of the cases of financial statement fraud 
involving a CEO had decisions. Eighty percent of the financial 
statement fraud cases were given a decision to cease the illegal activity. 
Only 2 of 125 cases were received punishment. This shows that when 
11 
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those with position of CEO commit fraud and are caught most likely do 
not to be punished for their actions. 
Thirty-three percent of the financial statement fraud cases that 
involved a CFO had a decision. Fifty percent of those that have a 
decision were a decision to cease the illegal activity. The other 50% 
decisions were those of punishments. The position of CFO needs special 
skills to complete the activities required of the position. Those skills go 
along with receiving a CPA license. Since a person needs a license to 
have the position, the SEC could take away the license. This shows that 
there could be a higher amount of decisions with punishments that the 
other positions within the financial statement fraud. 
Sixty-eight percent of the cases involving accounting fraud had 
a judgment, 39% of those judgments were for the person or company 
to cease illegal acts. Forty-one percent of those judgments involved 
punishment, with the most common punishment to be that of denying 
the person the opportunity to practice as an accountant or lawyer. In 
these judgments of being denied the opportunity to continue in the 
profession where the person had just committed fraud, there is an 
opportunity to apply in 3 years to be reinstated and be able to continue 
the career in which they had broken the law. This is dangerous because 
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they will be in the same situation they were in before and they will have 
the opportunity to commit fraud again. 
Seventy percent of the cases involving auditors had decisions 
against them. One of the reasons that this number could be so high is 
the fact that auditors are suppose to validate the information given by 
companies to help the public be sure that the company is giving correct 
information. If those checking the information to ensure honesty 
commit fraud, then the only ones to investigate or find the fraud is the 
SEC. There are so many companies, statements, and ways to commit 
fraud that the SEC cannot find all the fraud cases. In the case of the 
auditors, they are needed to ensure valid information and therefore if 
they commit fraud or fail to find fraud committed then they are 
punished faster to help the public has faith that the other auditors are 
correctly checking other company's statements. Seventy-two percent 
of the cases involving auditors that had a decision had a punishment 
involved. This reason for this high percentage could be the same as the 
reason that so many cases had a decision, because auditors have more 
rigid regulations and associated punishments. Another reason that so 
many cases had a punishment is that auditors have more specific rules 
and regulations concerning what they are suppose to look for and find 
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the specific regulations over auditors because their job directly 
correlates to the area that the SEC governs. 
The changes in the accounting industry have come because of 
fraud within the industry. These changes have come because of the 
laws passed by the government. The SEC was created to set 
regulations in the industry and punish those that break those 
regulations. The position a person holds in a company relates to the 
type of fraud committed. The type of fraud committed relates to the 
punishment received. Therefore the position a person holds in a 
company relates to the punishment. 
Twenty-seven percent of all CFO cases had a decision. Fifty-
three percent of those cases that had a decision were a cease illegal 
activity decisions. This is higher than those CFO decisions that relate to 
the financial statement fraud and CFOs. This shows that the type of 
fraud is not as important as making decisions. The reason that a 
greater amount of decisions are not punishments could be that the 
position of CFO is that most of the cases with CFOs involved also have 
other positions. The cases with multiple people and decisions are not 
easily placed with a decision because it is harder to find out who is 
guilty and how much everyone has a part of the illegal activities. 
14 
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Twelve percent of the CEO cases had a decision. Seventy-four 
percent of those cases that had a decision were to cease illegal activity. 
The reason that the cases with CEOs have a low rate of decisions made 
could be because there are so many different ways a CEO commit fraud 
and therefore each case needs to be looked at in detail to understand 
what has happened. The reason that this is different from the CFO 
cases is that the CFO has more responsibility over the financial 
statements. Another way that the CFO and CEO cases are different is 
that the percent that had a punishment was higher with the CFO. This 
is again because there is more accounting duties for the CFO and 
therefore the SEC can regulate the accounting information in a better 
manner. 
Eighteen percent of the president cases had a decision. 
Seventy-six percent of those cases had a decision of cease illegal 
activity. The cases involving presidents have the lowest percentage of 
decisions. This could be because the president is the position that has 
the smallest requirement on the amount of accounting skill and license. 
The number of cases that have a decision to cease is also greater than 
the CEO and CFO because the SEC has fewer types of punishment that 
they can use to discipline presidents. 
15 
I 
Corporate Positions and Punishment for Corporate Accounting Fraud 
Stephanie Curtis 
16,2 0 
Thirty-five percent of the auditor cases had a decision. Sixty-
two percent of the cases with decisions had a punishment. The cases 
involving auditors has the greatest number of cases with a decision. 
This is because their field has become more stringent in the activities 
that the auditor must do and what they cannot do. The SEC has made 
laws that require the auditors to find fraud with certain procedures. The 
number of cases that have punishment is also the highest in the group. 
This is caused by the same reason that the SEC has more authority to 
regulate the auditor and more methods of punishing auditors for 
committing fraud. 
This shows that the job or position in a company correlates to 
the likelihood of punishment. The reason that this happens is because 
the position in the company relates to the nature of the work that you 
do. The nature of the work that a person completes associates with the 
type of fraud that is committed. The type of fraud that is committed 
then relates to the amount of punishment that you receive. By the 
information found we can see that the SEC is most worried about fraud 
committed by auditors that would lead to financial statements being 
verified and still incorrect. This is one of the biggest problems that 
could happen because the verified information would state to the public 
that the information is correct when it is not. When auditors do their 
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job correctly, a person inside the company can commit fraud but the 
auditor will find it and the public will know that the information is 
wrong. 
The reason that there is a difference in the cases for CFOs, 
CEOs, and presidents is because of the responsibility that each position 
has regarding the financial statements and the relation to the company. 
The CFO has the largest responsibility to financial information. This 
means that the CFO should be a final check on the financial statements 
to keep them accurate. This is why the cases involving CFOs have 
more decisions. It is easier to look at the financial statements and state 
whether they are misrepresented than to look at the type of accounting 
used in a certain aspect and state whether that was the correct method 
used. The CEO and president are involved in the financial statements 
by making decisions that are strategic. An example is how the 
president and CEO could be involved in deciding what the proper value 
of some inventory is but not involved as much with the day-to-day 
accounting that the CFO is in charge of. 
The reason that there is a difference in the type of fraud 
committed and the decisions made are because so of the fraud is easier 
to find and prove. This makes it easier to make a decision. Another 
reason that there is a difference between the amounts of decisions that 
17 
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had been made in each type of fraud is because of the time taken to 
commit the fraud. An example is the difference between financial 
statement fraud and accounting fraud. With financial statement fraud, 
there are certain requirements that the financial statements must meet 
to not valid. When creating these statements the fraud is usually 
committed in an instance or a spot period such as changing the 
inventory balance. Accounting fraud usually happens over a period of 
time such as the changing an amount of a journal entry made daily to 
account for cash. Another reason that there is a difference between the 
amounts of decisions that had been made in each type of fraud is the 
types of fraud that can be committed in each category. The different 
types of improper behavior that could be judged can be greater than 
the type of accounting fraud committed. 
This paper has shown that there are correlations between the 
type of fraud committed and the position that a person holds in a 
company, the type of fraud committed and the punishment received, 
and the position a person holds in a company and the punishment 
received. This exists because of the relationship between the deeds a 
person completes with their job and the title. The activity a person 
completes correlates to the type of fraud that the person is able to 
commit. The type of fraud you commit is related to the ability to catch 
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and punish the fraud. The SEC is punishing more auditors because they 
have more rigid rules. This also leads to stricter punishments. The 
financial statement fraud is different per title because of the amount of 
responsibility the job has with the financial statements and how much 
accounting education is required for the position. The CFO has the 
most responsibility and has more punishments and decisions than the 
CEO and the president. This will lead to more discovering and reporting 
of fraud within the industry because the auditors and CFOs will be 
motivated to not commit fraud because they are more likely to be 
punished. This would mean that the president and CEO could not 
commit the fraud because they need the CFO and auditors to validate 
their information . This leds to the SEC having more time to focus on 
other problems that are arising in the industry and how to solve 
problems before they start . 
19 
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